Representation on the issue of European integration

Policy congruence between voters and the party they cast a ballot for at election time is at the heart of representative democracy. Research based on the 2009 European Elections study (www.piredeu.eu) and the EU profier (euandI.eu) data shows that on the issue of European integration the quality of representation on this issue across EU27 is as follows:

—MISREPRESENTED voters 30%
(a) pro-integration voter for an anti-integration party  
(b) anti-integration voter for an pro-integration party

—INDIFFERENT voters 21%
(a) neutral voter for an anti-integration party
(b) neutral voter for a  pro-integration party

—REPRESENTED voters 49%
(a) pro-integration voter for a pro-integration party
(b) anti-integration voter for an anti-integration party

—The represented voter  is either male or female with a high standard of living, interested in politics, with a clear party identification and left right position, and, as expected he/she attributes high salience to the EU.

The indifferent voter is highly educated, older, more likely to be female, more likely to  live in old member states.

—The misrepresented voters have a minimal knowledge about the EU, a low standard of living and no clear Left-Right ideological position.

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On the need to include political parties in contemporary constitutions

Constitutional regulation gives parties their own place in the polity. At the same time, parties set their own constitutional regulation in order to have legitimation. They want benefits from regulation: acknowledgement, subsidies, restriction of competition from anti-system parties, role distinction from ‘rivals’, guarantees against any misuse of power. Across countries, from proposals to amendment adoption, depending on their power status, parties have varying individual or collective reasons to move away from light regulation toward more robust regulation.

Why include political parties in contempoary constitutions?

First, constitutionalization brings the legitimation of parties’ agency role and the recognition of their importance as agents of citizens in a democracy.

Second, in order to ensure organizational survival and functional local branches throughout the electoral cycle, parties need resources and direct subsidies from the state which can compensate for declining resources from membership fees.

The third justification is the ‘elimination’ and clear role distinction from possible ‘rivals’ such as other political groups or associations.

The fourth justification is the gain of control over the entry of other parties into the system to restrict competition, especially from possible anti-system, undemocratic parties.

The fifth justification is related to the place that political parties have acquired in a political system and the need to prevent any misuse of power via special oversight and restrictions.

The sixth justification for party constitutional regulation is legal administrative necessity or efficiency gains for all actors involved in the process.

Source:  Borz, Gabriela, 2011, Contemporary Constitutionalism and the Regulation of Political Parties: A Case Study of Luxembourg, working paper series on the legal regulation of political parties, no. 09, September.